The purpose of this research is to provide a chronological study of the juvenile justice system in Louisiana focusing on the years from 1968 to the present. The research aims to track the important changes in juvenile justice policy and to pinpoint reasons for these changes, whether related to state or federal legislation, administration, or political or public demand. This research also focuses on how the current system has evolved. Is the system supporting rehabilitation, which is the principle on which it was originally founded, or is it enforcing "get tough" laws to ensure public safety?
 

The creation of the first juvenile court in America, in Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, in 1899, marked the culmination of more than a century of effort by social and legal reformers who wanted to see children removed from the jurisdiction of the adult criminal courts. Alarmed by the increasing family disorganization and the increase in antisocial behavior by young people that accompanied the growth of American cities in the 1800's, these reformers sought to create a strong but informal civil court to intervene in the lives of troubled young people. The objective of this intervention was "helping," sometimes called "salvation" (many civic reformers were religious reformers as well), and later called by the generic term "rehabilitation."

The juvenile court, which emphasized reform of young people over punishment, spread like wildfire. Almost all of the states had established separate courts for children by the end of World War I. The juvenile courts established under these reform statutes had four main features:

1. different procedures, more civil than criminal, from the adult court.

2. different terminology, in what the legal documents and proceedings were called.

3. a different set of actors, emphasizing the role of the juvenile court judge, the police juvenile officer, the juvenile probation officer, and later the juvenile social worker.

4. different institutions, for short-term and long-term housing, separating juveniles from adults. 

The end result would be a process and a system that worked with children (generically defined as persons under the age of 17 or 18) as an entity entirely separate and distinct from adult offenders. While the adult criminal court system emphasized punishment, the juvenile system attempted to follow a different track, emphasizing rehabilitation.

This would prove to be a difficult path for the system to follow, and one subject to many inconsistencies in the local and state legal systems of the time. In the South, for example, juvenile justice had to be applied within a social order built on a doctrine of "separate but equal" institutions for black and whites.

During the early to middle portion of the 20th century, Louisiana, like many other states, still operated under a segregated school system. This applied not only to educational facilities but also to correctional facilities.

Abiding by the state's segregation laws, legislation called for a separate facility to house white juvenile offenders. In 1904, the Louisiana legislature approved a bill to build such a facility in Monroe, Louisiana. Called the Louisiana State Reform School for Boys and later Louisiana Training Institute at Monroe, the facility is known today as Swanson Correctional Center for Youth. This facility was built to house white male youth and operated in that capacity until 1969. Act 175 of 1926 created The State Industrial School for Girls. This facility was opened to house white female persons between the ages of 12 and 19, who had been legally adjudged delinquent, neglected, incorrigible, or dependant.

In 1928, with the help of two African American educators, J.D Lafarque and Southern University President J.S. Clark, the legislature was convinced to create a similar institute for African Americans. Before that time, while young white boys were being sent to a juvenile training school for rehabilitation, young black boys were being sent to the state penitentiary at Angola, where they were treated as ordinary adult convicts serving hard labor in the fields. It was not until 1948 that the State Industrial School for Colored Youth was opened in Scotlandville, on the north end of Baton Rouge. This facility housed African American female and male offenders and was coeducational until 1956, when a separate girls dorm was built. In 1969 the Louisiana Supreme Court put into effect a desegregation order, which would end separate but equal correctional facilities forever.

In 1973, the Committee on Institutions for Youth and Adolescents of the Louisiana Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics conducted a study of Louisiana's juvenile correctional institutes. The study found that all but one facility "[had] excellent health programs" (Picayune, 1973). The committee reported that all facilities had adequate emergency care, care of illness, dental care, and pharmacy services. Regarding physical environment, the committee reported, "physical facilities were judged as quite adequate in all facilities studied." (Picayune, 1973) All of the institutions kept linens clean, served nutritious food attractively, separated inmates by age, and had precautions against homosexual assault. "The general feeling within the institutions was found to be rehabilitative in all but one institution." (Picayune, 1973) This study reinforced the public's protective attitude toward juvenile offenders during this decade. Authorities saw that there was no real need for strict security or strict rules. 

Later officials began to worry about the damage that could be done to non-violent offenders if they continued to be housed with more experienced criminals. If a youth was incarcerated for shoplifting during this time, he could and would be housed with another youth who had committed rape or even a murder. Another problem that officials faced was the soaring numbers of kids in custody. The youth crime explosion of the 1960's, when so many baby boomers reached adolescence, was beginning to cause an overcrowding problem. Officials knew that something had to be done to alleviate this problem. Status offenders had to be protected from the exploitation and criminal instruction of the more experienced criminals, and the overcrowding caused by the high numbers of incarcerated status offenders had to be addressed. The problems originated from the fact that large numbers of status offenders were being housed under state custody in state facilities.

Problems associated with the juvenile courts and with juvenile confinement nationwide led Congress to pass the Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) of 1974. The act was "a condition for state participation in the Formula Grants Program [that] set the 'sight and sound' separation requirements for juveniles in adult facilities but more importantly required deinstitutionalization of status offenders." (Synder and Sickmund) 

The sight and sound requirement from the JJDPA specified "juveniles alleged to be or found to be delinquent shall not be detained or confined in any institution in which they have contact with adult persons. The juveniles and adult inmates cannot see each other and no conversation is possible." (Synder and Sickmund) Under this act, which was intended to be applied to local jails, juveniles could not be housed close enough to adults where they could see them or hear them. The goal, which would prove difficult to achieve, was to completely separate juveniles from adults in local jails.

Authorities believed that if juveniles came in contact with the adult inmates, they could and would be intimidated, manipulated, or harmed. The most widely known harm "is that of physical and sexual abuse by adults in the same facility. The cases of assault and rape of juveniles [were] too high to be enumerated and too common to be denied," (Picayune, March 1980) according to Doyle Wood, juvenile justice specialist with the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The result of crimes against juveniles was that "juveniles sentenced or detained in facilities which also house adults have a suicide rate seven times that of a child held in a juvenile facility." (Picayune, March 1980)

Another provision of the act was the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. As stated earlier, status offenders comprised a significant percentage of all juveniles incarcerated. Such youth were locked up for running away from home, ungovernability, truancy, and other anti-social behavior. Under past conditions of confinement, they shared rooms with murderers and rapists. The longer the non-offender remained in contact with the delinquent, it was argued, the greater chance of him or her also becoming a delinquent. Legislators and many behavioral science experts believed that status offenders needed to be processed differently and treated separately from delinquents. They demanded that status offenders not be placed in secure detention facilities or secure correctional facilities. From that point on, status offenders had to be dealt with in a way that kept them out of secure custody. They could no longer be admitted into detention homes or state correctional facilities, as had been the practice since even before the creation of the juvenile court.

Two years after the development of Office of Youth Services, the juvenile probation office was placed under its jurisdiction. During this time, juvenile probation focused primarily on community alternatives. The probation officers served more as social workers with an emphasis on rehabilitation. The Lafayette office of juvenile probation required a full-time placement unit because of the high emphasis on rehabilitation. 

In 1978, the first code of juvenile procedure was enacted by the Louisiana legislature. For the first time juvenile probation and parole services were defined and the role of the probation officer was more clearly defined." (DYS Organization, 1991) Although the department's intentions were positive and hopeful, it operated for a long time with very little structure. No official policy manual for the probation officers existed until 1994. Before then, memorandums were sent out and telephone calls placed, in order for officers to communicate about policy decisions. "Basically whoever was in charge had the discretion to change whatever policy desired by sending out a memo to the probation officers." (Ken Stewart, 2000) The department's rehabilitative orientation stood out more than its lack of structure. 

In 1978, the Office of Youth Services joined three other state agencies to form a new bureaucracy, the Division of Youth Services. As provided in La R.S. 46:1903, the main purpose of this merger was to "improve, intensify, and coordinate efforts by state and local public agencies in coordination with voluntary agencies and organizations, citizen groups and concerned individuals in:

1. Preserving the unity of the family to the fullest extent possible

2. Preventing children from becoming delinquent

3. Preventing children and the public from suffering the consequences of criminal

behavior by substituting therefore programs for their supervision, care and rehabilitation, consistent with public interest and safety

4. Providing for coordination, planning, technical expertise, resources, and adequate financial assistance for services and facilities for the rehabilitation of delinquent children to the end that they may become and remain law-abiding, productive citizens

5. Providing services for the securing and maintenance of support of minor children by their absent parents pursuant to R.S. 46:236.1 and title IV-D of the Social Security Act
 

Youth Services benefited from widespread political and public support for more treatment options. "The public demanded more treatment services for youth offenders." (White, 2000) The juvenile justice system treated juveniles more leniently than adults because leniency was a part of the rehabilitation model, therefore creating more options for the juveniles. The system moved toward more social workers and gaining more highly educated staff. To rehabilitate juveniles, the individuals working in the system needed to be trained in rehabilitation. It was during this time that cottage parents were beginning to disappear; replacing them within the juvenile institutions were two separate career specialties--security and treatment. 

The late 1960's and the 1970's decade brought a lot of change in the juvenile justice system of Louisiana. From a segregated system with minimal rehabilitation for offenders, it was transformed into a desegregated system in which the main focus was rehabilitation. Changes were made in employee educational requirements so that offenders could be under the control of more trained, professional individuals rather than those who served as replacement parents. Also during these years, public and political officials were getting more involved in the rehabilitative care of the juvenile offender. The 1970's also saw the development of many community-based alternatives for juveniles, including group homes and expanded foster care placements. While the community options were specifically designed for status offenders, who were no longer supposed to be held in secure custody, many minor criminal offenders were also subject to these placements. The number of children held in detention in municipal and parish jails began to decline as a network of juvenile detention homes was built across Louisiana. The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 proved to be an important enhancement of the juvenile justice system in Louisiana.

The numbers of juveniles in Louisiana training schools began to climb again. Although rehabilitation was still a priority, policy veered off more in the direction of public safety. The training schools were flooded with agitated juveniles because of less space and less attention from employees, which caused more problems in interaction between offender and offender and between offenders and staff.

This "law and order" movement stirred for several years until in 1983, a consent decree was signed in Federal District Court in Baton Rouge. The consent decree, part of a larger court order affecting adult prisons and jails as well, capped the number of youth housed in training schools at one time based on health and fire standards. "While the ruling was designed to ensure that the inmates at these facilities received proper rehabilitative services in a safe environment, the limitation on bed space also forced the state to become more selective about the kinds of under-age criminals it placed in the LTIs-mainly those who have committed rape, murder and other serious crimes against people." (Tribune, 1989) 

In response to the decree, Don E. Wydra, who was serving as Assistant Secretary of the Office of Youth Development under Governor Edwin Edwards, cut back on bed space in the Louisiana training institutes. In 1984, this cutback resulted in the establishment of a waiting list for juveniles needing to be admitted into state custody. 

Although the consent decree did have the positive effect of preventing overuse of incarceration, it did have one negative affect: the waiting list. This new idea meant that violent and habitual juvenile offenders were left at home and on the streets until their names reached the top of the list. This wait allowed the juvenile to do even more damage before being admitted to a facility. "By 1989, there [was] a backlog of 190 other kids waiting to be placed in LTIs," (Tribune, 1989) according to Don Wydra. 

While decreasing overcrowding, this practice caused an even greater problem because now, as stated earlier, we were beginning to see more aggressive juvenile in custody for more violent crimes. With this thought in mind, political officials began to look to adult correctional authorities to manage these offenders. State juvenile services, which had been administered by the human services bureaucracy for more than a decade, were turned over to the Department of Corrections, then under the direction of Mr. Bruce Lynn. Officials believed this was a necessary step because the Department of Corrections controlled institutions, probation/parole, and all contract programs. "This would allow the Department of Youth Services to have access to all state services and they would be able to plug delinquents into each smoothly." (White, 2000)

The smooth transition from the institution to an appropriate aftercare program, both operated by the state, would undoubtedly benefit the juvenile, the argument went. It would also move the juvenile correctional model closer to the adult model, and under the same administration.

Louisiana, in the late 1980's, saw a steady increase in juvenile violent crime and a resultant increase in levels of public fear. The public no longer focused on rehabilitation as much as they had ten years earlier; now the focus was on safety. Because of this public concern, which sometimes led to an uproar, "Louisiana's judges began to demand more available bed space in the state institutions." (White, 2000) Judges wanted these dangerous juveniles off the streets and away from the public. Since more bed space was demanded, more bed space needed to be made.

Out of the need for additional bed space in state-run facilities for juveniles, the Short Term Offender Program was started at LTI-Bridge City, on the West Bank of the Mississippi in New Orleans. This program was a 180-day boot camp program designed for male offenders who had not committed personal offenses against other people but had committed minor property offenses. "It focuses on those children who could benefit more from the trauma of being away from the home environment and could use the experience of this intensive program to make a positive change." (Trusty, 1991)

Only the secure portion of the STOP program runs within the confines of the LTI-Bridge City. During this 90-day in-custody phase, an evaluation is done and a recommendation is made as to what the boy should do upon his release. Possibilities include: vocational training, mental health services, or family therapy. The second half of the program begins when the child leaves Bridge City and returns home. This is another 90-day leg under the intensive supervision of the juvenile probation department. Upon the successful completion of the 180-day program, the child is then discharged from supervision.

The 1980's decade brought Louisiana's juvenile justice system from a rehabilitation orientation to one that focused more on public safety. The management philosophy of Don Wydra, helped along by the population limits of the consent decree, resulted in a two-pronged juvenile justice policy:

1. juveniles believed capable of rehabilitation were dealt with through community-based alternatives.

2. more hard-core and habitual offenders would be confined in secure training schools, where rehabilitation was being de-emphasized and security heightened

The juvenile justice system was much larger that it had been a decade earlier. Juvenile arrest rates were increasing sharply. "In 1987, the total number of violent juvenile offenders arrested was 4,318; by 1988 that number had risen to 5,381, in New Orleans alone." (Tribune, 1989) The percentage of juveniles in secure custody was decreasing, however, as more status offenders and minor offenders were placed in local programs monitored by probation officers.

A foreshadowing of future policy change took place in 1987 when local probation offices terminated their placement units and merged them with other line functions. Juvenile probation officials took this as a sign that rehabilitation was out of favor and enhanced supervision was in. The public wanted violent juvenile offenders placed in secure institutions, a principle reflected in policy changes during this time.

The public and political uproar was like nothing like the Department of Corrections had seen before. Fear of the crimes committed by these dangerous juveniles, who came to be known as "superpredators", was taking over and spreading across the state. State institutions were torn between the need for higher security and the traditional goal of rehabilitation. Something new--perhaps something drastic--had to be done to deal with these new offenders.

In 1992 Bruce Lynn left with the change of governors, and a new Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections was named. Richard Stalder took over as secretary, and under him Reginald Grace was named Assistant Secretary of the Office of Youth Development. This new leadership would make a huge impact on the juvenile justice system in Louisiana. Although the populist Democrat Edwin Edwards appointed Stalder, his reputation was that of a conservative professional. 

Stalder established clear-cut policies and goals where none had previously existed. He demanded safe, secure facilities emphasizing public safety as his first priority. Stalder seemed to view juveniles as simply being just younger versions of adults, and many of his policy changes were seen as treating juveniles like adults. Early in his administration, "He cancelled the agency's participation in group homes and focused more on security," (Ken Stewart, 2000) although this action proved unpopular enough that it was soon rescinded. He announced plans to double the number of secure beds in juvenile institutions, from about 1,000 to 2,000, by the year 2000. Persistent negative publicity about violence, escapes, and other "unrehabilitative" conditions within Louisiana's training schools quickly brought to the attention of the public that if juveniles could not feel secure inside the facilities, then rehabilitation would never work. If a child went to bed at night in fear, then he or she could not focus on school or treatment the next day. 

Coming from adult corrections and having held the position of warden of a men's prison, Mr. Stalder felt that security had to be placed first on the list of priorities. No stability meant no rehabilitation, and this is the idea that the department was going to be operated by. Stalder never said that he was opposed to rehabilitation as a juvenile justice policy (although some juvenile officials believed he did not think much of the concept). He did emphasize accountability of the community-based juvenile programs, enhanced supervision of juveniles in the community by probation officers, and a secure, more controlled environment for juveniles placed in institutions.

The Children's Code gave juvenile court prosecutors and judges the authority to require families to seek help for problems relating to a child's anti-social behavior, but the courts would find that resources were often lacking to address these problems, especially in small towns and rural areas. Not every parish has a FINS program and families that live in towns that do not have this resource have difficulty gaining access to the help. For example, if Lafayette has a FINS meeting and a family lives in Kaplan, lack of transportation or money to get transportation to Lafayette for the meeting can stop the family from getting the help they need.

The Children's Code made minor changes in the law, such as raising the minimum age for placing juveniles in secure custody from nine to ten, but mainly its effects were the consolidation of juvenile laws from various codes, the elimination of contradictory or inconsistent provisions, and the clarification provided by rewriting a volume at one time in one writer's voice. The new code protects the juvenile's rights while making clear the obligations and authority of the Department of Corrections. The emphasis on family involvement in correcting delinquent behavior is also an important legal doctrine, though for now it remains more an expression of intent than a reality.

The juvenile system was put in a sensitive predicament, because the administrators felt that the public would complain if inmates were escaping, but would also complain if they saw juvenile prisoners in leg irons and handcuffs. This was a difficult balance that the department was expected to reach. The Human Rights Watch aimed at reducing levels of violence in juvenile institutions. In one of its reports, it cited a 15-year-old inmate at the East Baton Rouge Louisiana Training School who had written a letter to the 1995 Human Rights Watch, saying, "That's a messed up place, the guards will beat you. . . . one of the guards calls you in the back where we take showers and beats you for a whole hour, it has happened to me twice". (Human Rights Watch, 2000) Stalder reported that "Six guards at LTI and seven at the juvenile prisons near Monroe were fired in the past year and that more changes would be made in response to the allegations." (Advocate, 1997)

This transfer was not used as a disciplinary action, but it would allow officials to consider disciplinary history, gang affiliation, and tendency toward violence as factors in the decision. Special classification committees at each facility were formed to decide which inmates were best suited for transfer; however, the warden of each facility made the final decision. The facilities named in a local newspaper article as those that received transferred juveniles were Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, David Wade Correctional Center, the Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women, and two diagnostic centers. (Advocate, 1997) 

As usual, arguments arose on both sides of this decision, and both had legitimate points. "A 1980 study by a University of Illinois professor, showed suicide rates of juveniles placed in adult facilities seven or eight times higher than juveniles who remain in juvenile facilities." (Advocate, 1997) Opponents felt that juveniles were more likely to be abused or sexually assaulted if they were transferred into adult facilities that were not equipped to handle juvenile offenders. However, Kelly Ward, warden at Wade Correctional Center, stated that "15-17% of the inmates housed at Wade already were between the ages of 17 and 21, so the facility was already equipped for younger inmates and this transfer created no new problems." (Advocate, 1997)

Supporters of the new law believed that such a "get tough" approach was long overdue. State Rep. Steve Windhorst, R-Terrytown, who was co-sponsor of the legislation authorizing the transfer, felt that transferring hardened juvenile criminals to adult prisons would show them that they would be punished for criminal misconduct. In return it would be a beneficial change in juvenile justice. Another supporter, Judge Pamela Taylor Johnson said she believed "the upcoming transfer [was] a good idea not only because it [would] consume some of the backlog in local facilities, but also because juvenile prisons should become safer for younger inmates once the older offenders [were] gone." (Advocate, 1997)

Louisiana had made an important decision in trying to reduce overcrowding in its juvenile facilities. By late August 1997, 32 inmates from three juvenile facilities had been transferred to two adult prisons. "Another 24 inmates from Jetson, Tallulah, and Swanson Correctional Centers were sent to David Wade Correctional Center in Homer, " according to George White. Ten others were also removed from the LTI system, for a total of 66 transferred inmates. The law succeeded in alleviating the overcrowding and backlog in Louisiana's juvenile justice system. Richard Stalder, the Corrections Secretary, said, "The new law gave officials a much needed tool to whittle away at the backlog of juvenile inmates." (Advocate, 1997) Many other officials were also pleased with the outcome of this new transfer law.

Shortly after the 66 juvenile inmates were transferred to adult prisons, David Utter, attorney and director of the Juvenile Justice Project in Louisiana, represented a youth in a lawsuit who claimed he was sexually assaulted at Wade Correctional Center. A total of five youths challenged the transfer order, and on March 11, 1998, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that "the practice of such transfers was unconstitutional," and that the five youths belonged back on juvenile campuses. One main focus of the lawsuits was that the prisoners in adult prisons served "hard labor," which meant that they pleaded guilty to a felony or been convicted in a jury trial; however, juveniles were only tried by a judge, and therefore could not serve hard labor. In response to this court decision, Secretary Stalder ordered all the other 61 juveniles back to juvenile facilities.

The first was in Tallulah, located in Madison Parish in northeast Louisiana. This facility opened in November 1994 under the control of Trans-America Development Associates. It housed both a boot camp program, called the Louisiana Intensive Training and Education Program (LITE), and a maximum custody long-term residential program. Trans-America had an agreement with the state to house 700 juvenile inmates at capacity. When it opened it confined 520 juveniles, which immediately made it one of the largest juvenile institutions in the country. 

Tallulah Correctional Center for Youth was in trouble from the start. Under the leadership of Warden Susan Wible, the center quickly became known as a "dumping ground" for disciplinary problems and for mentally ill and mentally retarded juvenile offenders from the other state juvenile facilities.

Immediately upon opening, the center faced high staff turnover, poor educational program results, and many allegations of physical abuse of juveniles. Because of the allegations, U.S. District Judge Frank Polozola assumed authority over conditions at Tallulah, including the approval of any population increases. With each request to expand, Judge Polozola ordered a court-appointed prison expert, John P. Whitley, to inspect the center and file a court report. 

In a preliminary report, Whitley stated that the staff at Tallulah was "ill equipped to handle those juveniles." (Advocate, 1998) It was obvious that the staff was not properly trained for the care of juvenile offenders. This type of problem should have been foreseen because, according to a 1996 study done by Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention, "the biggest problem with conditions of confinement is related to staff deficits in specific knowledge and skill areas." Employees coming directly off of the streets cannot be expected to do enter a new juvenile facility and perform a job only a trained professional can do. Such a situation became evident at Tallulah as the staff had little, if any, additional training beyond high school.

Another problem Tallulah faced was inadequate educational services available to the residents. Whitley's April 1997 inspection report stated that, "Security officers raced from room to room to restore order in the classrooms." Later the officers told him that this was really a quiet day. Whitley went on to say "a teacher sat idly at his desk while the juveniles he was supposed to be educating [were] yelling, sleeping or climbing over their desks." (Advocate, 1997) Many teachers complained of insufficient security inside the classrooms. Classes were not being taught because the juveniles did not abide by the rules set by the teachers and there were not enough guards in the classes. This lack of security led to a teacher sickout in March 1997.
Although these problems were big ones, by far the biggest problem that Tallulah would face was the allegations of abuse toward the juveniles. This problem would cause Trans-America to lose control of the facility. Tallulah was named by a local newspaper "the most violent center in Louisiana." Large numbers of juveniles were transported to the infirmary daily after fights. Violence was rampant, both offender on offender and staff on offender, which sparked the interest of federal investigators, who began to investigate the allegations of brutality in the center. 

The state ultimately stepped in, and Richard Stalder sent state prison officials to train staff and help to the facility develop an adequate management program. Improvements were made almost immediately as the state officials aided staff in the daily running of Tallulah. People thought the improvements occurred not because the staff was getting better, but because the state was operating the facility for them. The state officials finally got to the point that they felt their jobs were done and turned the facility back under complete control of Trans-America under new leadership. 

During the state intervention, David Bonnette was sent to Tallulah from the Louisiana State Penitentiary in an advisory capacity. In September 1997, Bonnette took over as warden of Tallulah. Under his leadership, many beneficial changes were made and, "Polozola authorized 80 new beds, largely under his improvements." (Advocate, 1998) His improvements consisted of: "a reduction in the number of fights between inmates, increased medical staff and new recreation, religious, and educational programs for inmates." (Advocate, 1998) Judge Polozola stated that remarkable progress had been made by Bonnette and authorized yet another 20 beds, raising the approved number to 620 beds in the facility.

Despite all the positive things that the new warden did, juveniles were still crying out about abuse. A shocking incident occurred in the summer of 1998, when Senator Paul Wellstone, (D-Minn.) and other mental-health advocates toured the campus. Five teenage inmates broke away from their dorms and climbed to the top of a building located near the visitors and yelled out, "they beat us. . . they don't give us enough food. . . they just feeding us more today because of ya'll." (Advocate, 1998)

This scene caused quite an uproar, suggesting that despite Bonnette's many accomplishments the facility still lacked day-to-day order and stability. The incident proved to be too much for the warden and, in the face of the nearly constant criticism of prison conditions, Bonnette soon resigned. 

Upon receiving Bonnette's resignation in late July of 1998, "state officials assumed management of Louisiana's only privately run juvenile prison." (Advocate, 1998) The new state warden of the facility was Mr. Gary Gremillion. After five months under state control, Correctional Services Corporation, a Florida based company that runs over 17 juvenile prisons around the world, made a deal with Trans-America and took control of the facility. According to Ms. Dora Wheat, executive management officer at the Department of Corrections at the time, "this change [meant] the end of state takeover of day-to-day prison operations." (Advocate, 1998) 

This attempt failed also and Tallulah was eventually taken over by the state. It is now operated as a branch of Swanson Correctional Center for Youth in Monroe, an old and relatively stable training school with a good reputation.

The second private facility opened at Jena, in central Louisiana, on December 3, 1998. The impetus for this juvenile prison came from Texas developers in 1992. Many problems arose concerning the financing of the prison, and the Texans were later named in search warrants and subpoenas issued in a wide-ranging federal investigation. 

These ongoing complications, which killed the prison plans for a few years, could have been viewed as a sign from God that this was not a good idea. Apparently no one was paying attention, because in 1997 Wackenhut Correctional Corporation, a leading private correctional organization, bought the rights to the Jena center.

One year later the 276-bed facility was built. Wackenhut expected to avoid most of the pitfalls of Tallulah and to relieve some of the pressure of overcrowding the other juvenile facilities. However, to a great extent, history repeated itself, only faster. 

Immediately the center had to confront allegations of physical abuse, teachers who did not teach, lax security, high staff turnover, and insufficient training. Just as Tallulah had suffered criticism because of abuse, so did Jena. A lot of abuse was supposedly going on in the center, again associated with large numbers of untrained staff.

Only 16 days after the center opened a near-riot incident occurred, ending with two juveniles sent to the hospital and officers with minor bruises and scrapes. Food was the major factor in the December 19, 1998 incident. Juveniles caused the uproar after being promised by one of the guards their snack upon completion of the evening head count. When the count was over the guard locked them back up without fulfilling his promise and the juveniles retaliated. The ensuing chaos spread to other units and the disturbance had to be quelled with the use of tear gas. David Utter, from the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, said that, "insufficient food was among the complaints [he] had been hearing about from [his] clients at Jena. . . . every kid [he] talked to complained of hunger." (Advocate, 1999)

Jena went downhill from there. Only two months after its opening Mike Wodkins, prison warden, resigned and a new interim warden was assigned: E.L. Sparkman. A few improvements were made under Sparkman's administration but it seemed as though this juvenile prison was doomed to fail. Allegations of staff on juvenile and juvenile on juvenile abuse continued to be reported. Because of this, and the lack of education and many other on going problems, Wackenhut shut the institution down.
After the Jena facility was closed, Secretary Stalder was asked to summarize Louisiana's experience with privatization of juvenile facilities. "Not a success," he said, adding that he did not intend to house any juveniles in private training schools in the future. As the decade ended, all of Louisiana's juveniles in secure confinement were held in state-operated institutions.

As far as policy changes, the 1990's changed the juvenile justice system probably the most of the three decades this research covers. The appointment of Richard Stalder made huge changes in policy alone. It was a different type of leadership, which brought about a different type of system emphasizing more use of secure custody to enhance public safety. The Louisiana Children's Code, The Human Rights Watch, and Project Zero Tolerance all impacted the system's direction. 

During this decade we saw greater numbers of habitual and violent offenders than we had seen before, and we saw important changes in response. In a U.S. Senate meeting held on June 17, 1997, Mr. John Ashcroft, senator from Missouri, addressed what he called a significant problem: the growing problem of violent juvenile crime. He stated in the meeting that "if we take crime lightly, they will take order lightly," and that we were not talking about juvenile mischief any more, we are talking about assaults, murders, rapes, and armed robberies. Senator, now Attorney General Ashcroft, along with other officials, believes that to make an impact on juvenile crime some things are going to have to be changed, because the things that we were doing in the past were not designed to address the different category of circumstances, the different culture we have today. Senator Ashcroft said: "What we have done in the past is not working today." (Congressional Record, 1997) 

Juvenile policy overall has turned toward the senator's line of thinking. It definitely is more public safety or security based than previously, although without completely abandoning rehabilitative programs for the juveniles.

In the latter part of the 1990's, the official name of the Louisiana's juvenile institutions was changed from "training institutes" to "correctional centers for youth." In some respects, this name change reflects the ironic spirit of the era: just when the juvenile institutions are adopting even more of the features of the adult prisons, the name is changed to imply a rehabilitative purpose that is no longer of the highest priority.
 
 
 
 

Bartollas, Clemens and Stuart J. Miller. 1994. Juvenile Justice in America. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
 

Bejeaux, Ernest. 2000. Personal interview, Lafayette Juvenile Probation Office, Lafayette, LA. (February).
 

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